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Some most questionable information has been distributed by the press and others regarding 
Canadian farm incomes over the past few weeks.  This has led to misunderstanding of the 
situation, rather than enlightenment.  Moreover, it has spawned some rather narrow, over-
simplified, and short-sighted Asolutions@ to the farm income problem.  The senior author of this 
report has been around agriculture for more than thirty years and the farm income problem has 
cycled several times during that period.  Therefore, it is not likely to go away as a result of 
simple, short-sighted and narrow  Asolutions@.   Hopefully, this short analysis will at least clarify 
what=s happening and introduce a clear statement of the trade offs and dilemmas faced by 
governments and farmers in dealing with the problem.  
 
Our objectives in this paper are, first, to show the pattern of net and gross farm incomes during 
the past several years in Canada.  By so doing, we intend to indicate that every farm is not the 
same; i.e., the situation is not the same for livestock, horticultural, and cash grain enterprises.  
Some farms specialize in one or another of these, some have combinations.  Therefore, there is 
no such thing as Athe@ farm income situation.  We will show that the income problem is primarily 
focussed on the grain industry.  Our intent is to then illustrate the major cause of that problem.  
This, in turn, will lead to a fairly clear illustration of the dilemma that faces farmers and policy-
makers as they try to figure out what to do. 
 
Overall Farm Incomes 
 
Statistics Canada provides fairly detailed information on farm incomes, and it will be the basis 
for this discussion.  One thing that needs to be clarified from the start in is the difference 
between gross and net farm income.  (In major news coverage in the past few weeks, the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation seemed not to grasp this difference).  Gross farm income 
is the total amount of income that is received from farming.  It=s also referred to as Acash 
receipts@.  Net farm income is what is left over from gross farm income after expenses are 
paid. 
 
                                                 
1The authors are CEO. Research Associate, and Research Assistant at the George Morris 
Centre.   2
Figure 1 shows gross and net farm income from 1994 - 2000.  Statistics Canada has reported 
final data through 1999 and the first three quarters of 2000.  Therefore, the data in this figure 
include our forecasts of  the final estimates for 2000.  Also note that from 1995 onward, we 
show gross and net, both with and without direct government payments included




From 1995 - 2000, gross farm income increased from roughly $27 billion to $32 billion, when 
direct government payments are included. It increased by about $4 billion (from $25.5 bil to 
$29.5 bil), even without direct government payments.  So, when one looks only at gross income 
data, one is tempted to ask, Awhat=s the problem?@.  
 
The problem becomes a little clearer when one looks at net farm income.  After peaking, at 
almost $3.5 billion in 1996 (before direct government payments), it declined steadily and is little 
less than $900 million in 2000. 
 
So, these data mean the following in light of some of the things that have been reported in the 
past two weeks: 
 
                                                 
2Direct government payments are payments made directly to farmers from federal or provincial 
governments for income assistance.   
$  While gross farm income is at or near a record level, net farm income is 
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not and it is getting close to zero without direct government support. 
$  This means that costs rose faster over the past several years than did 
revenue. 
$  Direct government payments represent considerably less than 10% of 
gross farm income, not the 75% reported by the CBC (it was about 75% 
of net farm income in 2000).  
 
But this still does not describe the situation in sufficient detail to understand what=s happening. 
 
Income by Major Enterprise 
In this section, we show the trends in gross farm receipts from livestock, horticultural products 
and field crops.  Field crops, in turn, are sub-divided  into oilseeds (canola, soybeans, etc) and 
grains (corn, wheat, barley, etc.). These data also come from Statistics Canada and are used to 
calculate gross farm income, as reported above.  Unfortunately, they only show gross receipts 
for each of the categories of farm products.  The data are not reported in a way that allows 
calculation of net income from each category of crops. However, if one thinks about the trends, 
it is reasonably easy to infer which of the commodity groups have had the most problem with 
net farm income.   
 
Figure 2 shows gross revenue from livestock sales between 1994 and 1999.  While the 2000 
data are not in, it is quite clear that these receipts were up again for 2000.  The data indicate 
that gross revenue from livestock sales increased from about $12.5 billion to $15.5 billion over 
the period.   
 
Figure 2 
























Source:  CANSIM Matrix 3571  4
Figure 3 shows gross revenue from sales of horticultural products.  This includes everything 
from sugar beets to potatoes to other vegetables,  and all fruits.  The data show an upward 
trend through 1999 from about $1.8 bil to $2.5 bil.  That trend continued in 2000. 
   5
Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 shows gross revenue from grains and oilseeds beginning in 1994.  In this case, we can 
see that farm receipts increased for grains through 1996, then fell rapidly.  We anticipate that 
the final numbers for 2000 will be slightly lower for grains than they were in 1999.  Similarly, 
receipts for oilseeds increased through 1998, then dropped substantially.  Again, we expect that 
these will be down further in 2000.  This means that, by 2000, gross farm income from these 
two categories was as low or lower than in 1994, unlike livestock and horticultural products. 
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Now what about the net income (i.e., after expense) performance of each of these categories?  
As indicated above, Statistics Canada does not report the data in such a way that these are 
easily calculated.  However, some common sense would lead us to the following points: 
$  Livestock eat grain: feed is the major cost of raising livestock. Since 
livestock receipts were increasing and grain prices were decreasing, it 
follows that livestock net income should have been increasing over the 
period. 
$  Both horticultural products and grains and oilseeds require similar kinds of 
input.  They require land, labour, fertilizer, seed (or  seed stock), crop 
protection products and machinery.  Of course, each one requires these 
products in different intensities.  However, the complement of inputs is 
similar.  Most of these inputs were rising in cost during the period from 
1994 through 2000.   
$  Following from the above, one would expect, since horticultural gross 
incomes continued to rise, that net income probably also rose somewhat 
during the period. 
$  On the other hand, since gross revenue from cash grain was declining, it 
follows that these are the products for which net profits declined.   
 
From the foregoing we conclude that there is not really a Afarm income@ problem.  Rather there 
is a grain and oilseed income problem.  This problem is intensified in a few regions where either 
excess (Southwestern Manitoba) rainfall or too little (Southern Alberta)  rainfall limited crop 
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yields.  This is not to say that there are not short term problems among other products.  Clearly, 
in late 1998 and early 1999, hog producers had a major short term income problem because of 
some of the lowest real (adjusted for inflation) prices for hogs in history.  However, overall 
during the past half decade or so, the livestock industry has enjoyed relative financial health.   
 
Hopefully, the foregoing can help focus the analysis and discussion on: 
$  What=s the cause of the problem? 
$  What, if anything, should be done about it? 
 
We turn now to the first of these two questions.   
 
 
What=s the Source of the Grain and Oilseed Income Problem? 
 
While there are several causes of this problem, we believe one is central.  Interestingly it is not, 
as reported by one analyst, that Awe have too many farmers for market conditions@.  It is, rather, 
that there are too many dollars of subsidies being paid to US producers, and being paid in a 
way that is totally market distorting for grains and oilseeds
3. 
 
The US farm subsidy program has a number of components.  We will discuss three.  One is a 
Aloan rate@ program that is used for feed grains and wheat.  Feed grains include corn and 
barley.  The second component is the soybean program.  The third is a set of  Aemergency@ 
payments.  In our view, the soybean program, which was first introduced in the 1996 Farm Act, 
is the fundamental problem that contributes to chronic over production of both oilseeds 
(soybeans) and grains in the US. Because the US is such a dominant player in world commodity 
markets, this drives down prices for Canadian farmers. 
 
Let us explain how these programs work. 
                                                 
3The focus here is on the US.  The European Union is also in the subsidy business.  Its subsidies 
are even more complex.  This discussion illustrates what we believe to be a major problem, and the EU 
simply prolongs and exacerbates it.   
$  Feed grains and wheat.   For feed grains and wheat, US farmers can 
obtain a Anon-recourse@ loan from the federal government before, during 
or after seeding time.  The amount of the loan is determined by a Aloan 
rate@ and the farmer=s acreage and yield history.  The loan rate is a price 
per bushel at which farmers can borrow money from the government in 
the spring before seeding.  If the market price after they produce their 
products is above the loan rate, they can sell their grain and pay back the 
loan without interest.   If it is at or lower than the loan rate, their loans do 
not have to be paid back at the loan rate.  What makes this program rather 
interesting is that, in general, when the market price falls below the loan 
rate, corn or wheat moves into storage and is removed from the market.  
Therefore, the loan  rate becomes a floor price, under which the market   8
rarely falls.  The price in the United States, is also essentially the price in 
Canada, adjusted for exchange rate. This is because Canadian production 
is relatively small and, therefore, has relatively little impact on US and 
world prices.  Currently, the loan rate for corn is $1.86/bu and the loan rate 
for wheat is about $2.50/bu. 
 
$  The soybean program.  The soybean program works very differently than 
the feed grain and wheat programs.  It has what is called a  Aloan 
deficiency payment@.  In this case, farmers can also borrow money at the 
loan rate but there is no storage program that removes the product from 
the market to maintain it at or near the loan rate.  Rather, the market finds 
its own level and then farmers get a deficiency payment equal to the 
difference between the market price and the loan rate when the market 
price is lower.  
 
$  The emergency payment program makes additional payments based on 
net farm income.  Unlike those discussed above, their  pay outs are not 
based on the price level of any given product.. Thus they likely have little 
effect on what or how much farmers produce.  Therefore, we do not deal 
with it further in this presentation. 
 
The fundamental problem created by these programs results from the level of support in the 
soybean program, and from the interaction between the soybean and feed grains/wheat 
programs.  The soybean Aloan rate@ is set at $5.26/ bushel.  This is higher than production cost 
for many US growers. Therefore, it is an incentive for them to produce.  As a result of increased 
production from the subsidy, actual market prices at harvest time for the past two crop years 
have been lower than the loan rate.   
 
US farmers have the alternative of producing soybeans, corn, wheat or other commodities, or to 
not grow anything on some acres
4.   Crop rotations require a combination of grains and oilseeds 
be grown, but they still have tremendous flexibility.  The support level for soybeans is so rich 
that there is fear each year that producers will want to produce as many of them as possible at 
the expense of corn.  Therefore, each winter or spring before planting time, there is concern that 
the market needs to Abuy@ corn acres from soybeans.  In the winters of 1998/99 and 1999/2000, 
there were concerns (often promulgated by the USDA or other US government agencies) about 
the possibility of drought the following summer.  During the current winter, the big issue is high 
natural gas prices, which may affect the price of nitrogen fertilizer.  (Corn production requires 
nitrogen, soybean production does not).  Therefore, the concern is that even without the 
distorting impact of the soybean program, higher nitrogen costs would favour soybean 
production. 
                                                 
4The focus below is on the relationship between soybeans and corn.  The same arguments hold 
for wheat, but the relationship is likely not as strong because wheat and soybeans are not as close 
substitutes on some soils as are corn and soybeans.   9
 
Each year there is an element of legitimacy about these factors, despite the fact that droughts in 
January rarely affect the next summer=s crop.  This is where the interaction sets in: ie the need 
to Abuy back@ corn acres from the soybean subsidy is manifested by distortions in corn price 
relationships.  Figure 5 shows the price relationships that occurred each year since the 1998 
crop year for the  Anearby@ and December futures contracts at Chicago for corn.  We use 
December because it is the first new crop contract.  For example, in April of 1999, the May 
futures price at that time is a forecast of the price of corn the next month (May, 1999) that was 
harvested the previous fall (1998) and is now in storage.  The December futures price in April is 
a forecast of the price of corn the following fall, after the 1999 crop is harvested. 
 
Figure 5 
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The key to understanding the distortion is that in normal, i.e., non-subsidised times, the 
December futures contract in a given year is expected to be discounted to the nearby contract, 
not at a premium.  A premium normally means that there is fear of a shortage of the product and 
the futures market gets bid higher to encourage corn to be stored into the new crop year.  In 
normal times, since there will be a new harvest before December, the market does not 
encourage people to store old crop corn into the new crop year. For example, in January we 
would normally expect the March futures contract (the nearby at that time) to be at a higher 
price than the contract for the following December. This more normal behaviour is evident in 
three of the four years before the 1996 Farm Act as is clear from the graph in the Appendix. 
   10 
Now notice in Figure 5 that each year between roughly December and May, the December 
futures contract was at a premium, in fact a very substantial premium, to the nearby contract
5. 
Each year both the nearby and the December rose sometime either in or just after December 
and that the December tended to go to the  $2.50 - $2.60 area.  Generally, $2.60/bu is a price 
that makes growing corn attractive relative to soybeans, when soybeans will be no less than 
$5.26.  When December corn gets to this area, US farmers= expectations are raised and/or they 
enter into forward contracts at this price, ensuring that they plant more corn.   
 
Our assessment is that the driving force is the soybean subsidy.  By overpricing soybeans, the 
corn market must be distorted for a period of time to ensure that corn continues to be produced 
even though it is quite clear that too much is being produced. (US inventories of corn and 
soybeans rose each year of the three that have been completed in Figure 5, and are expected 
to again this year).  The eventual result is that both the corn and the soybean prices are driven 
down at harvest time.   
 
Obviously, it is too soon to tell whether the pattern will repeat itself again this year, but  to date it 
looks familiar. 
 
The bottom line is that the soybean program causes more soybeans to be produced than should 
be.  It causes the corn market to over react, so too much corn is produced.  So, what the US 
has done is essentially stabilize the US corn market in a range between $2 and $2.35 as a 
result of these programs.  Too much is produced and there is little opportunity for prices to rise 
above this range.  The only factors that can possibly break the cycle are a real weather disaster 
or a continuation of the build up of surpluses to a point where the US government can no longer 
stand the cost.  Then the policy will lurch in another direction, just as it did in the 1996 farm bill, 
which created the current problem.  So, once again, farmers are at the mercy of the elements 
and government policy whims.   
 
Canadian farmers are not eligible for US farm programs.  They cannot obtain US $5.26/bu from 
the government for soybeans.  They have to make their decision based on the market price.  
They do have the opportunity to respond to movements in the US corn market by forward 
contracting or hedging.  In fact, we recommended  to our subscribers
6 in December 2000 that 
they should contract their corn for next fall delivery at roughly C$3.50/bu (the then Canadian 
equivalent of US$2.60, adjusted for local basis).  This is not a wonderful price, but it is 
substantially better than the Canadian equivalent of $2.00.  However, not many farmers do this 
and they end up selling their corn for the cash price at or shortly after harvest.  As can be seen 
from the graph, these are much lower prices than the forward contract prices.   
 
Implications for Canadian Farm Management Decisions and for Canadian Farm Policy 
 
                                                 
5In our data, the nearby is March until the end of February, May until the end of April, July until 
the end of June and September until the end of August 
6The George Morris Centre publishes the Canadian Commodity Review8 , a bi-weekly market 
letter that analyses market trends for 12 commodities and discusses marketing and purchasing 
strategies..  For a free issue contact Cher at 519-822-3929 extension 207. As part of the strategy 
mentioned above, we had earlier suggested that corn producers buy Call options as a hedge against the 
possibility that the fertilizer threat would be real.   11 
The US program changed, particularly to include the loan deficiency payment for soybeans, as 
a result of the 1996 Farm Act.  This act was passed at a time of record high grain prices and 
almost record high soybean prices.  The combination of record high prices in 1996 for grains 
and the soybean support price at a level above reasonable cost of production was then the 
cause, since 1998, of the cheap food policy that has ensued.  If it were not for the subsidies and 
the reaction to them in the corn market, then acreage would be taken out of soybean and corn 
production because market prices would be able to fall to discourage that production.  However, 
with the artificial support program, there is no incentive for US producers t o reduce their 
acreage of soybeans and, therefore of corn
7.  
 
So, putting the first two parts of this paper together, the problem for Canadian farmers and 
policy makers is that the farm income problem is focussed in the grains and oilseeds area and it 
is a problem that is not of the making of Canadian farmers.  It is made largely in Washington. 
We haven=t talked about the European Union=s subsidies here, but they are also a contributor to 
the problem.  There are some things a Canadian farmer can do in response to the situation.  
 
$  With this repeating pattern of December corn futures prices going to 
substantial premiums over the nearbys in December  - April, farmers in 
Canada can act to take advantage of the temporary increases.  In each of 
the past two crop years, we advised our subscribers in  Canadian 
Commodity Review8 to make those decisions at or near the highest prices 
of the year.  At the same time, as indicated earlier, we made 
recommendations to take advantage of the situation should prices rise 
even higher in case there is a real, instead of a contrived problem with 
weather or fertilizer. The alternatives for soybeans are less clear because 
the actual market available to Canadian farmers seldom exceeds the 
government market available to US farmers. 
                                                 
7 Again, this argument has been made in terms of corn.  It also applies to wheat, although the 
substitution relationship is not necessarily quite as close for wheat and soybeans as it is for corn and 
soybeans.  Both corn and wheat prices are quite low, and at harvest time, hover around their loan rates. 
$  Beyond this, a number of grain and oilseed farmers have found ways to 
add value through identity preservation (IP) programs.  These are helpful 
and can add significant income, although they also add cost.  In general, 
IP programs include a premium over the commodity price.  So long as the 
US and EU subsidies continue, the value of IP programs to farmers 
therefore remain limited by the underlying commodity price.  
$  Another thing that farmers can do is to diversify into different products.  
This is very clearly happening in western Canada where a number of 
former grain producers are investing in livestock production and/or moving 
into specialty crops.  Again, these decisions can clearly enhance incomes.  
Of course, the problem with this is that if many people expand production 
of other products because of the US and EU subsidies for grain and   12 
oilseeds, then they will eventually drive prices down for those products 
also.  Therefore, the effects of the US subsidy program for soybeans and 
feed grains will eventually spread out to other products. 
 
Canada=s government faces a number of dilemmas in developing a policy response. There are 
at least the following elements. 
 
$  The problem is caused by foreign programs and is not the fault of 
Canadian farmers. From an equity and fairness perspective, society must 
decide if it has a responsibility to protect farmers by matching US 
subsidies. Some would argue they should be matched on a per capita 
basis.  
$  Canada has an ongoing farm safety net program, called NISA (Net 
Income Stabilization Account).  With this program, federal and provincial 
governments contribute, with the farmer, to a farmer=s account and which 
provides tax advantages for the farmer=s contribution when incomes are 
good, and provides a fund to draw on when incomes are poor.  NISA 
accounts are not being drawn down much.  
$  In addition, there is a multitude of part time farms in Canada, and they are 
included in the data from Statistics Canada.  Therefore, there is a 
tremendous range of profit performances in the country. This means that, 
while the income problem is focussed primarily on the grain and oilseed 
industry, it does not mean that all grain and oilseed producers have a 
problem.  So, who should government target, and how does one ensure 
equity?  Should the government target those grain and oilseed producers 
who have a problem and not those who don=t?  Many would argue that this 
would reward people for poor performance and/or penalize those who do 
well.   
$  A few farmers argue the last point very specifically  - ie that government 
payments help intensify the net income problem in the long run.  Under 
this argument, farmer >x= works hard  to be efficient and keep costs down.  
Farmer >y= has higher costs.  If government makes a payment, both get it, 
and now farmer >y= has additional funds to bid higher for crop land to rent 
for next year.  Therefore, farmer >x= has also to bid higher.  The result is 
that both pass on their government money to someone else as higher 
costs.  So, at the limit, all a payment does is lead to increased costs and 
no assistance with net income.  
$  This leads to the broader issue that payments from government eventually 
get capitalized into costs.  As a result of high subsidies in the US, and 
lower ones in Canada, there is considerable evidence that land costs are 
lower in Canada.  Therefore, in the long run, Canada has a cost 
advantage.  And Canadian farmers have the additional advantage that 
they learn to adjust when  Amarket@ conditions change, as in this case 
where the subsidy gives the US an advantage in oilseed production. 
$  The problem with the foregoing argument is obvious.  If one can=t survive 
the short run because there is too little cash flow to keep you afloat, the   13 
long run will never come.  Moreover, making adjustments usually means 
committing large amounts of capital.  If one does so and then the policy 
wind changes in Washington, then it=s possible to adjust from one bad 
situation created by the old bad policy to a new one created by the next 
bad policy.  
 
So this describes the dilemma.  Fundamentally, Canadian governments are blessed by no 
better foresight than individuals when it comes to anticipating how to adjust.  Any policy decision 
sends a signal to adjust in some way, and can result in a cure as bad as the disease.  We 
believe the underlying issues require careful consideration of Canada=s alternatives.  Knee jerk 
reactions such as, ACanada has too many farmers for market conditions@ are not useful because 
they fail to address the cause of the problem.   
 
What is really needed is a vision of what Canadian agriculture can do to achieve success 
despite the vagaries of US commodity policy, and then to develop policy instruments that will 
assist in realizing that vision.  Ad hoc policies developed to respond to immediate needs are 
likely just a little mortar on one crack of the dyke that will cause another to open up later. Or 
another way to think about it is to find policy instruments that give immunity from the disease 
rather than treating its symptoms.   14 
Appendix 1 


















































Nearby Prices December Futures Prices
 
 
 
 